Research Overview

My current research ranges across topics in philosophy of mind and metaphysics in early modern philosophy. My dissertation and much of my active research is on Descartes, Henry More, and Samuel Clarke. I also have active projects on Anne Conway and Emilie Du Châtelet. Additionally, I have worked on figures earlier in the history of philosophy, including Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Aquinas.

Below, you will find a list of active (but not published) research projects, divided into the following three categories: (i) my dissertation, ‘Early Modern Dualisms and Unities of Consciousness’, (ii) additional early modern projects, and (iii) other projects.

For my published work, please see my ‘Publications’ page.

Early Modern Dualisms and Unities of Consciousness (Dissertation)

In this dissertation, I explore the arguments for the indivisibility of the mind that are advanced by three significant early modern dualists: René Descartes (1596–1650), Henry More (1614–1687), and Samuel Clarke (1675–1729). I contend that all three of these thinkers put forth variations of what is now known as the ‘Achilles argument’, an argument that moves from the experienced unity of consciousness to the claim that the mind which experiences this unity must itself be an indivisible substance. My focus on the particular ways in which each of these three thinkers develops and defends their version of the Achilles is revelatory both of crucial metaphysical and psychological commitments of their philosophical systems as well as their relationship to the other philosophers considered in this dissertation and the changing intellectual environment writ large. Moreover, since early modern discussions of the mind, particularly those concerning consciousness, have profoundly shaped how we think about the mental today, this dissertation provides a window into how we have arrived at the current contours of some of the most significant debates in the philosophy of mind today.

The dissertation comprises the following three chapters:

Descartes on the Indivisible Mind and the Unity of Consciousness

In this paper I provide a sustained investigation into Descartes’s account of the indivisibility of the mind and his understanding of the unity of consciousness. My examination is centred on a crucial passage in Descartes’s Sixth Meditation (AT VII.85-86/CSM II.59), in which he claims that, in contrast to the ‘always divisible’ body, the mind is ‘utterly indivisible’. After determining that really distinct parts are being ascribed to the body and denied to the mind, I turn to consider just why Descartes takes the mind to be indivisible. I argue that the two views present in the literature, the subject unity view and the mereological simple view, are not explanatorily satisfactory. This leads me to present and defend my own reading of the passage, in which I contend that Descartes puts forward an Achilles argument in this text, moving from our experienced unity of consciousness to the claim that only an indivisible mind could have such an experience. While scholars have denied that Descartes employs an Achilles anywhere, I systematically elucidate the presence of all of its elements within this passage and draw them together to explain why he takes the mind to be indivisible. I show, moreover, that appeals to different forms of holenmerianism – the view that the mind exists ‘whole in whole and whole in part’ – form a crucial aspect of Descartes’s version of this argument. Finally, before concluding, I consider and overcome an objection to the indivisibility of the mind, presented in the form of a ‘reverse Achilles’ and raised by Gassendi, by appealing to Descartes’s theory of distinctions and the sort of unified consciousness that he takes us to have.

Henry More on the Conscious Extended Mind

In this paper I consider one of the most-innovative aspects of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More’s (1614–1687) substance dualism wherein both kinds of substance, Body and Spirit, are spatially extended, though Spirit, but not Body, is indiscerpible – that is, unable to be actually divided. I begin by contending that More, responding to Hobbesian materialism, argues for the existence of spirit by putting forth an Achilles argument, which moves from our experienced unity of consciousness to a claim that only an indiscerpible mind could have such an experience. I then turn directly to More’s account of substance dualism before drawing out a significant aspect of More’s account of Spirit, which is that it, like a body, is heterogeneously extended with partes extra partes. Next, I develop the worry of exactly how a Morean spirit could be extended, partes extra partes, yet be unable to undergo actual division – even by the power of God. I consider four possibilities for how this might be the case – including those recently offered by Reid (2012) and Blank (2013) – but contend that none, ultimately, are satisfactory. This leads me to posit my own interpretation, in which I argue that More can appeal to his account of our unified consciousness to contend that the immediacy and totality of the phenomenal presentation to a single subject of consciousness suggests its indiscerpibility, focusing particularly on an argument More makes to this effect regarding the experience of pain.. After developing this position, I consider an objection from the apparent discerpibility of the souls of lower animals, and contend that More has a plausible way to evade this objection by appealing to the plasticity of the spirit. Finally, I briefly conclude, having defended Morean dualism and the indiscerpibility of the extended mind.

Samuel Clarke Against the Emergence of Consciousness

In this paper I consider the significant 1706–1708 correspondence between Samuel Clarke, a Newtonian and substance dualist, and Anthony Collins, a freethinking friend of Locke and materialist with respect to the created world. This debate is significant for a number of reasons, one of which is that it provides the occasion for an extended early exposition of, and attack on, the view, put forward by Collins, that consciousness might emerge from a system of appropriately-organized matter. It is the purpose of this paper to focus on how Clarke attempts to resist Collins’s argument for emergentism and, in so doing, defend his own view that consciousness belongs to an indivisible soul. I first discuss the intellectual background of the correspondence, in which the ‘thinking matter’ debate ignited by Locke heavily features. Next, I develop Clarke’s claim that the mind is indivisible, which I contend comes in the form of an Achilles argument, moving from our experienced unity of consciousness to the claim that only an indivisible mind could have such an experience. Then, I analyze Collins’s version of the emergentist argument, as it is refined over the course of the correspondence. Having put these pieces in place, I turn to consider just how Clarke proposes to escape the force of this argument. After rejecting two suggestions put forward in the literature, I argue that Clarke’s strongest response comes in his ‘Fourth Defence’ (at The Works III, 890-891), in which he denies that anything can have a purely potential capacity that is dependent on relational or extrinsic realizations. Finally, I consider an objection to Clarke’s view that consciousness cannot arise in a material system due to that system being divisible, which presses on the fact that, for Clarke, the mind is extended and, thus, seems to be divisible as well, at least by God. I argue that Clarke can escape the force of this worry by appealing to holenmerianism – the view that the mind exists ‘whole in the whole and whole in the part’ – such that it cannot be divided. Moreover, I contend that this holenmerian appeal will help to further sustain Clarke’s argument that only an indivisible mind could experience a unified consciousness, by pointing to features of consciousness that seem to require that the mind exist in a holenmerian manner. With that, I briefly conclude, having shown how Clarke claims to overcome an early emergentist view of consciousness,

Additional Early Modern projects

Émilie Du Châtelet on Love

Émilie Du Châtelet, a French noblewoman who lived at the height of the Republic of Letters from 1706 to 1749, is best-known today for her work on, and translation of, Newton’s Principia Mathematica, her own influential treatise, the Institutions de physique, and – perhaps most notoriously – as the muse, sometime-collaborator, and fifteen-years-long lover, of Voltaire. While these facets of Du Châtelet’s life and scientific works have begun to receive increased scholarly attention, her distinctive and philosophically rich theory of love has thus far been largely overlooked. It is the purpose of this paper to rectify this omission by providing a sustained examination of Du Châtelet’s account of love as it is developed in her treatise, Discours sur le bonheur, and as it is exemplified in her personal letters. First, I explain why it is important to become clear on Du Châtelet’s understanding of love by demonstrating the central role that it plays in her overall account of happiness. I then turn to elucidate four key elements of her theory of love itself. Having done this, I next develop a two-pronged worry for Du Châtelet’s account of love, which is that neither it nor the happiness that it produces seems to be sustainable, since, on Du Châtelet’s view, love both structurally wanes and involves putting one’s happiness in the fickle hands of others. I consider two possible responses to this worry, with the first being the suggestion that it should not, after all, be taken to be a concern for Du Châtelet and the second being the position, raised by Lascano, that Du Châtelet holds that love – and, in turn, happiness – can be sustained, through rational foreplanning that involves the temporary suspension of desire. I argue that, despite seeming initially plausible, neither position is ultimately sustainable. These considerations lead me to present an alternative way in which Du Châtelet can overcome this worry, wherein I argue that Du Châtelet believes love can be sustained, not directly by reason, but through the continued production of the dual emotions of hope and fear through the aid of reason. After presenting evidence for this position from the Discours with support from Du Châtelet’s letters, I then briefly conclude, having developed a robust account of Du Châtelet’s philosophically rich theory of love and examined just how she thinks that this passion – crucial to our happiness – can be maintained.

Other projects

Aquinas on Artifacts and Substances

Recent scholarship on Aquinas has displayed a heightened interest in his position on the metaphysical distinction between substances and artifacts. In this paper, I first examine and motivate the standard interpretation – that Aquinas believed no substances are artifacts – and delineate three unsuccessful attempts by this interpretation to provide a metaphysical grounding for this claim. Next, I introduce several passages where Aquinas affirms the substancehood of a sub-class of artifacts, suggesting that Aquinas held a more-nuanced position than indicated by the standard interpretation. I then show that Brown’s (2007a) attempt to salvage the standard interpretation, despite these passages, is unsuccessful. Further, I contend that neither of the two alternative interpretations – i.e., Rota’s (2004) position that all artifacts are substances which are created in accordance with natural powers, or Marmodoro & Page’s (2016) argument that artifacts possessing descending forms are ‘deficient’ substances – offer a satisfactory metaphysical grounding either. In light of these difficulties, I present a new criterion by contending that Aquinas believes that anything is a substance which is self-generating and self-organizing. I demonstrate how this criterion is able to successfully classify natural substances, artifact-substances, and non-substantial artifacts, by permitting only those artifacts which undergo chemical changes to be considered substances.

The Stoics on Visual Perception

According to the Stoics, it is sense perception that, if conditions are right (LS 40L), provides the basis for cognitive impressions and, ultimately, ἐπιστήμη, being given to us by nature as ‘the standard of scientific knowledge and as the natural foundation for the subsequent impression of conceptions of things upon the mind’ (LS 41B). Gaining clarity on how sense-perception occurs is therefore integral to understanding not only Stoic psychology but, crucially, their epistemology as well. This task is particularly difficult, however, because, as Long & Sedley (1987) point out,  there is ‘meagre evidence on the mechanics of sensing’ for the Stoics, a fact which leads them to suggest that ‘the Stoics were largely content to take over Peripatetic doctrines, adapting these to suit their dynamic materialism’ (321). In this paper I shall focus on visual perception – which is the sense modality that is best attested to in the extant evidence – and contend that contra Long & Sedley, the Stoics do have an independent theory that is innovative and significantly different from the theories put forward by both Aristotle and Plato.